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Introduction 
On December 11, 2008, Natalie Erger and her seventy-eight year-
old husband’s financial lives came to a screeching halt. In a matter of 
seconds they had gone from comfortably retired to penniless. They 
still had three car payments, a mortgage, and other living expenses, 
but they suddenly found themselves with no money except Social 
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Security payments and the balance in their checking account.1 They 
couldn’t make their mortgage payments or find someone to purchase 
their home, and they found it nearly impossible to work at their age.2 
Natalie and her husband were “trapped in a life style that [they] 
never would have chosen if [they] knew [they] didn’t have the money 
to support it.”3 Despite their personal hardship, they worried even 
more about their children and grandchildren. No longer could they 
afford a tutor for their grandson with a learning disability or fly their 
eleven grandchildren out to see them for the holidays. Instead, they 
had become destitute, requiring assistance from their children and 
siblings just to survive.4 The Ergers’ story, like those of so many 
others, was the catastrophic result of investing their life savings in 
Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. But the con man’s fraud was not 
limited to novice investors such as the Ergers. He stole from longtime 
friends,5 charitable organizations,6 and even celebrities such as Steven 
Spielberg.7 A few investors, so distraught after learning of the fraud, 
even took their own lives.8 
 
1. U.S. Attorney’s Letter and Attached Victim Impact Statements at 19, 
United States v. Madoff, 09 Cr. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://i.usatoday.net/money/_pdfs/09-0616-madoff-victims.pdf. 
2. Id. (letter from Natalie Erger to Judge Chin) (“I can’t roll back the 
clock and become 40 again. I’m told I don’t have the technological skills 
that are required for even entry level jobs. . . . My husband . . . [who] 
served his country in the Korean War . . . went to work doing telephone 
customer sales for commission only. He worked from 7:30 a.m. until 8:30 
p.m. six days a week. He was terminated after three months because he 
did not make the quota of sales they projected. He is now trying to do 
hosting at a local bagel store.”). 
3. The Ergers stated that they never would have bought an expensive 
home in a residential country club community if they had known about 
the Ponzi scheme that decimated their financial lives. Id. 
4. Id.  
5. See Christine Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative): 
Bernard Madoff, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 947, 958 (“Madoff rendered 
penniless . . . his best friend Carl Shapiro.”). 
6. See Andrew Kirtzman, Betrayal: The Life and Lies of Bernie 
Madoff 247 (2009) (stating that the $15.2 million invested with Madoff by 
the Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity had been completely wiped out). 
7. Hurt, supra note 5, at 960. 
8. Rene-Thierry de la Villehuchet, a wealthy hedge fund advisor, locked 
himself in his office above Midtown Manhattan, took a number of sleeping 
pills, and slashed his left arm open with a box cutter after hearing about 
Madoff’s arrest. Villehuchet had placed around $1.4 billion of his own and 
his clients’ funds with Madoff. See Alex Berenson & Matthew Saltmarsh, 
The Suicide of a Trader Contributes to Mysteries, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 
2009, at B1. 
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These horrific tragedies led to the appointment of Irving Picard as 
the Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) Trustee on December 
15, 2008 for Bernie Madoff and Bernard L. Madoff Investment 
Securities (“BLMIS”).9 As trustee, Picard’s duty is to investigate the 
financial affairs of Madoff and BLMIS, recover and reduce to money 
as much property as possible, and deliver that money in a way that is 
most “practicable in satisfaction of customer claims.”10 This power 
has resulted in over 1,000 lawsuits against individuals and companies 
that he claims owe money to families such as the Ergers. The lawsuits 
require Picard to seek recovery of funds predominantly from two 
groups of individuals and entities who actually benefited from the 
fraud: “feeder funds,” which were entities that helped recruit investors 
to join the scheme, and “net winners,” investors who joined the 
scheme early and withdrew far more fictitious profits than they 
invested in principal. From the feeder funds, Picard seeks to recover 
fees and other forms of compensation they received, as well as 
punitive and compensatory damages, under theories of stolen 
customer property and unjust enrichment.11 From net winners, Picard 
seeks to recover fictitious profits and in some cases invested principal, 
citing theories of fraud and willful blindness.12 Unfortunately, many of 
these lawsuits are doomed to fail or to recover only a fraction of what 
is sought. In fact, courts have already ruled against Picard in some of 
them.13 Considering these inevitable outcomes, the need for a new 
approach when dealing with asset distribution following discovery of a 
Ponzi scheme has become apparent. 
This Note explores criminal and civil asset forfeiture by the 
United States government as a viable alternative to bankruptcy 
proceedings when dealing with Ponzi schemes and the fair distribution 
of recovered assets to victims. It focuses on current and recently 
settled litigation dealing with Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme and the 
liquidation of assets, but also suggests how assets should be seized 
and distributed as Ponzi schemes are uncovered in the future. Finding 
 
9.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–78lll (2006).  
10. § 78fff-1(b)(1) (2006). 
11. See Amended Complaint at 17, Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC, 450 B.R. 406 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Adv. Pro. No. 09-1364 (BRL)) [hereinafter HSBC Bank 
Amended Complaint] (“[T]he Trustee seeks the return of Customer 
Property belonging to the BLMIS estate, including redemptions, fees, 
compensation, and assets, as well as compensatory and punitive damages 
caused by the Defendants’ misconduct, and the disgorgement of all 
amounts by which the Defendants were unjustly enriched at the expense 
of BLMIS’s customers.”). 
12. Amended Complaint at 6, Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(Adv. Pro. No. 10-5287 (BRL)). 
13. See discussion of feeder fund and net winners cases infra Part II. 
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a way to collect and distribute Ponzi funds efficiently and fairly will 
be important for years to come as “[t]he drying up of money caused 
by the recent financial crisis has unearthed numerous Ponzi schemes 
nationwide.”14 
Part I describes how a Ponzi scheme such as Bernie Madoff’s 
works and the types of entities from which a SIPA Trustee attempts 
to recover funds. Part II identifies current bankruptcy trustee tactics 
used to recover assets from third parties involved in Ponzi schemes. It 
also shows why Picard is unlikely to recover the funds he seeks from 
these third parties. Courts have begun to find either that he does not 
have the requisite standing to recover the funds he seeks or that he is 
severely limited in how far back in time he may reach to recoup 
fictitious profits from investors. This Part examines recent high-
profile cases and opinions,with a focus on the now-settled lawsuit 
against the owners of the New York Mets. 
Part III discusses asset forfeiture as an alternative to bankruptcy 
proceedings in light of forfeiture’s history and purpose. Part III also 
explains how asset forfeiture is currently used in Ponzi-scheme cases to 
recover the assets of individuals responsible for the fraud. It explores the 
current criticisms of the government entering into an area that has 
historically been the exclusive realm of bankruptcy trustees. It also 
refutes those criticisms by explaining that the government has the same 
goals as the SIPA trustee—fair distribution of monies to victims. Finally, 
Part IV discusses why asset forfeiture is a more cost-effective and 
efficient option for recovering and distributing funds than the bankruptcy 
proceedings currently in place. It proposes that criminal and civil asset 
forfeiture is the best solution for dealing with the assets of the individual 
responsible for the Ponzi scheme, as well as the assets of third parties 
who benefitted from the fraud in some way. Asset forfeiture would allow 
for the quick recovery and distribution of funds to Ponzi scheme victims 
on a pro rata basis without thousands of costly lawsuits. 
I. Ponzi Problem: Collecting and Distributing Money 
that Does Not Exist 
A. How a Ponzi Scheme Works 
Bernie Madoff’s scheme was simple. His company, Bernard L. 
Madoff Investment Securities, was registered with the SEC as a 
securities broker-dealer and run by its “founder, chairman, and chief 
executive officer, [Bernie] Madoff, with several family members and a 
number of additional employees.”15 To perpetuate the fraud, Madoff 
 
14. Joshua Marcus & Jake Greenberg, Recent Development, Ponzi Schemes: 
Washed Ashore by Recession’s Low Tide, Reveal Controversial Issues, 
Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Oct. 2010, at 48. 
15. Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 440 B.R. 
243, 250 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that the firm consisted of 
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would keep accounts for all of his investors and show them statements 
containing fictitious profits made from securities trades.16 But in 
reality, Madoff was not making any trades at all.17 He simply 
recruited individuals to invest in his firm, and then used their money 
to pay other investors when “requests for distribution of ‘profits’ were 
made.”18 Eventually, the money began to dry up as people began 
taking much more out than was coming in via new investments. In 
the end, “the market that Madoff had dominated for decades finally 
destroyed him.”19 The burst of the housing bubble in 2008 and the 
resultant global financial crisis spelled the end for BLMIS. The jig, as 
they say, was up.20 
B. The Unenviable Task of Recovering Fictitious Profits 
Once a Ponzi scheme such as Madoff’s is discovered, the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) steps in under 
SIPA.21 Although created by statute, the organization is not an 
“agency or establishment of the United States Government.”22 Rather, 
it is a nonprofit membership corporation, funded by its registered 
broker-dealer members.23 The mission of the SIPC is to help return 
assets to customers of brokerage firms that close due to various 
financial difficulties.24 Under SIPA, the SIPC may file for a protective 
decree with a U.S. district court if it determines that any member of 
the SIPC “has failed or is in danger of failing to meet its obligations to 
 
three units—an investment advisory business, a market making 
business, and a proprietary trading business—and that the fraud was 
conducted through the investment advisory unit). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. (“[T]here is no record of BLMIS having cleared any purchase or sale 
of securities in the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation.”). 
18. Id. at 251. 
19. Harry Markopolos, No One Would Listen: A True Financial 
Thriller 200 (2010). 
20. See id. at 201 (“[T]oo many of Madoff’s investors were desperate for 
cash to protect their investments and meet their growing client 
redemptions, and attempted to withdraw their money—apparently these 
requests totaled more than $7 billion.”). 
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78lll (2006). 
22. § 78ccc(a)(1)(A). 
23. § 78ccc(a)(1), (2)(A). 
24. See The SIPC Mission, Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., www.sipc.org/ 
Who/SIPCMission.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) (“When a brokerage 
firm is closed due to bankruptcy or other financial difficulties and 
customer assets are missing, SIPC steps in as quickly as possible and, 
within certain limits, works to return customers’ cash, stock and other 
securities, and other customer property.”). 
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customers.”25 As a registered broker-dealer, BLMIS was a member of 
the SIPC, and after the fraud was revealed it became obvious that the 
company would not be able to meet its obligations to customers. Thus, 
the SIPC filed an application for a protective decree, which was granted 
by the district court. The protective order gave the court complete 
control over Madoff’s property, and also required the appointment of a 
trustee for BLMIS to redistribute assets to investors.26 
Trustees under SIPA have the same duties as a trustee under 
Title 11 of the bankruptcy code, and the additional duty to “deliver 
securities to or on behalf of customers to the maximum extent 
practicable in satisfaction of customer claims.”27 With a Ponzi scheme 
as massive as Madoff’s, these duties become much more difficult than 
simply liquidating company assets and distributing them according to 
customer claims. The trustee, Picard, along with a massive platoon of 
attorneys, special experts, consultants, and international counsel, is 
“engaged in a broad range of activities . . . including evaluating 
claims, conducting forensic analysis of years of documents, working 
through complex negotiations, filing and responding to motions, 
assembling detailed complaints and litigating them.”28 The result of 
these investigations, going on since December 2008, has been over 
1,000 lawsuits in which Picard seeks to recover over $100 billion.29 
The lawsuits grabbing many recent headlines involve two groups that 
were a part of the Madoff scandal, feeder funds and net winners.30 
Picard is seeking to recover funds he believes these groups do not 
deserve, as they either failed to perform due diligence when recruiting 
investors for BLMIS or they received fictitious profits that should be 
returned to victims who lost everything.  
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(3)(A). 
26. See § 78eee(a)–(b)(3) (stating that the SIPC may “file an application 
for a protective decree with any court competent of jurisdiction,” and if 
the court issues a protective decree, it shall also appoint a trustee for 
the liquidation of the business for the debtor). 
27. § 78fff-1(b); see also 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) (listing the duties of a 
trustee involving bankruptcy proceedings). 
28. Irving H. Picard, A Message from SIPA Trustee Irving H. Picard, The 
Madoff Recovery Initiative, www.madoff.com/trustee-message-
02.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
29. Michael Rothfeld, The Man with the Thankless Job, Wall St. J., Mar. 
5-6, 2011, at B1. 
30. See Diana B. Henriques, Despite Doubts, JPMorgan Kept Ties to 
Madoff, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2011, at A1. (discussing lawsuits filed by 
Irving Picard against JPMorgan and other feeder fund banks that he 
claimed received millions of dollars in fees from BLMIS without 
performing proper due diligence); Richard Sandomir, Actions of Madoff 
Victims’ Trustee Will Be Reviewed, N.Y. Times, July 29, 2011, at B15 
(acknowledging that Congress will be investigating the actions of Picard 
in regard to his lawsuits against net winners of Madoff’s scheme). 
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1. The Feeder Funds  
Feeder funds in a Ponzi scheme such as Madoff’s are banks and 
individuals “that acted as middlemen between Madoff and the 
investors [and] were, in effect, an ad hoc sales force.”31 They would 
seek investors and then outsource management of the invested funds 
to Madoff.32 In return, Madoff would pay these banks handsomely, 
often hundreds of millions of dollars, as a type of finder’s fee. In 
addition to being a sales force, although they claim to not have 
known it, they provided Madoff with a “legitimate structure” between 
his fraud and investors that gave him a “protective buffer to help . . . 
fend off skeptical inquiry.”33  
The easiest way to understand how feeder funds work is to put 
oneself in the shoes of an investor. Assume you are an individual who 
wants to invest your life savings for retirement. You approach a bank 
or investment advisor about investing your money in various types of 
securities, and in return you pay them a fee. Unfortunately, that 
advisor is “feeding” your funds to Madoff without doing his or her 
proper due diligence in investigating him, and in a sense double-
dipping between your fees and fees he or she receives from Madoff’s 
company. Since your advisor did not recognize the red flags indicating 
that Madoff was a fraud (or chose to ignore them), all of your money 
is lost when the scheme is uncovered, even though you have no idea 
who Bernie Madoff or BLMIS is.34 Situations such as these are the 
reason Picard has chosen to file lawsuits against banks such as HSBC 
and JPMorgan Chase.35 
2. The “Winners” of the Ponzi Scheme 
Another group of individuals and companies from whom Picard is 
attempting to recover are the net winners. Not everyone who invested 
with Bernie Madoff lost his or her life savings. In fact, some investors 
 
31. 6 Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Bromberg and 
Lowenfels on Securities Fraud § 19:17 (2d ed. 2012). 
32. Id. 
33. Id.  
34. For an example of this involving Madoff and his feeder funds, see People 
ex rel. Cuomo v. Merkin, No. 450879/09, 2010 WL 936208, at *1 (N.Y. 
App. Div. Feb. 8, 2010) (“[The New York Attorney General alleges that 
Merkin] blindly fed the investors’ funds into a Ponzi scheme 
orchestrated by Bernard L. Madoff . . . while claiming that [he] was 
actively managing those funds.”); see also Amended Complaint, Picard 
v. HSBC, supra note 11, at 52 (claiming that HSBC observed and 
internally reported many signs that indicated a massive fraud, specifically 
in the form of “supernaturally consistent returns,” but did not report out 
to anyone). 
35. See discussion of feeder fund cases infra Part II.A. 
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actually ended up with significantly more money than they put in.36 
Picard filed hundreds of lawsuits against these “winners” so as to 
redistribute the money invested with BLMIS evenly.37 The winners 
tend to be individuals who invested early with Madoff and his Ponzi 
scheme, and in doing so took out enormous “profits” over the years. 
Unfortunately, those profits turned out to be nothing more than 
money coming in from subsequent investors in the fraud. Picard hopes 
to recover these fictitious profits through what have been dubbed 
“clawback” suits.38 Clawbacks are essentially a means of “recovering 
benefits that have been conferred under a claim of right, but that are 
nonetheless recoverable because unfairness would otherwise result.”39 
Picard hopes to use this theory to act as a type of legal Robin Hood, 
taking from the rich and giving to the poor. 
II. Difficulties Arising from the  
Trustee’s Recovery Tactics 
Following a Ponzi scheme, the trustee has a duty to oversee the 
liquidation of the offending company, distribute assets of the fraud, 
and create “the largest Customer Fund . . . possible” so that every 
creditor can receive some compensation for his or her loss.40 This 
includes holding sophisticated investors such as feeder funds 
 
36. Picard alleges that by December of 2008, Saul Katz and Fred Wilpon, 
through their company Sterling Investors, family members, trusts, and 
entities, had withdrawn approximately $300 million in fictitious profits, 
along with over $700 million in principal from BLMIS in the six years 
before the Ponzi scheme was discovered. See Amended Complaint, 
Picard v. Katz, supra note 12, at 138–39. This Note will focus on 
Picard’s lawsuit against the owners of the New York Mets for a number 
of reasons, although hundreds of very similar suits against other parties 
have been filed. Their case has received a lot of publicity due to the 
celebrity of the parties and the significant amount of money involved, 
making it influential in the other “clawback” cases. 
37. Despite the staggering number of lawsuits, it is important to note that 
Picard is not going after absolutely everyone who made a profit from 
the scheme. See Dick Carozza, Balancing Act: An Interview with Irving 
H. Picard, Madoff Trustee, Fraud Magazine, July-Aug. 2010, at 36, 
38 (stating that he realizes many of the individuals who received 
fictitious profits are elderly or have serious financial or medical 
hardships, so he will only seek to recover funds from parties who were 
significant net winners). 
38. See, e.g., Jane J. Kim, As ‘Clawback’ Suits Loom, Some Investors Seek 
Cover, Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 2009, at C3 (describing how many 
investors are preparing for “clawback” suits by Picard). 
39. Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract 
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi 
Schemes, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 368, 371–72 (2009). 
40. Picard, supra note 28. 
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accountable for turning a blind eye to the giant red flags and warning 
signs at BLMIS.41 Additionally, the SIPA Trustee must ask investors 
who withdrew more fictitious profits than they deposited to return the 
excess money and have it redistributed fairly.42 Not surprisingly, the 
net winners are unwilling to do so. The result has been numerous 
lawsuits opposing the “clawbacks” and even questioning from members 
of Congress about these actions.43 Some members of Congress believe 
that “clawing back” funds in this manner from innocent individuals 
goes against the SEC’s goal of protecting investors.44 
Nevertheless, Picard has targeted both groups in court. The suits 
against feeder funds have asked for not only the return of millions of 
dollars in fees but also punitive damages for failing to perform due 
diligence in investigating BLMIS. Had the feeder funds investigated 
properly, the result likely would have been a far earlier end to one of 
the largest frauds in history. Picard has continued his lawsuits against 
net winners as well, although not against individuals whom he has 
deemed to have “extenuating financial circumstances” that would 
make returning the funds a substantial hardship.45 Although a 
number of these cases are still in litigation, some early opinions 
strongly suggest Picard will not receive the type of recovery he hopes 
for. 
A. The Feeder Fund Cases 
As a result of the feeder fund actions, on December 5, 2010, 
Picard filed an amended complaint against HSBC and thirty-six other 
defendants, labeling them “feeder funds and various service providers 
to the funds,” seeking $2 billion under bankruptcy law claims and 
another $6.6 billion under common law claims.46 He filed similar 
claims against other banks, such as JPMorgan Chase & Co., as well.47 
Both complaints were originally filed in bankruptcy court but were 
removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York as they contained two issues that required “substantial 
 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Sandomir, supra note 30, at B15. 
44. Id. 
45. Picard, supra note 28; see also Zachery Kouwe, Madoff’s Trustee Starts 
Victims’ Hardship Plan, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2009, at B5 (describing 
how Picard evaluates each investor’s situation to determine whether he 
will ask them to return funds or not). 
46. Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC (HSBC I), 450 B.R. 406, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011).  
47. See Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 49, Picard v. 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08-1789 
(BRL)). 
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and material interpretation of non-bankruptcy federal law.”48 Those 
issues were (1) “whether the Trustee [had] standing to bring [such] 
common law claims” and (2) “whether the Trustee’s Action is a 
‘covered class action’ that is preempted by [the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act].”49 
For the common law claims, Judge Jed S. Rakoff ruled that 
Picard, in his capacity as SIPA Trustee, lacked standing in federal 
court to sue the feeder funds.50 The reason was that, in federal court, 
“a party must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot 
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third 
parties.”51 Picard argued that he has standing to bring common law 
claims against banks such as HSBC on behalf of the creditors or 
customers who were swindled by Madoff.52 He asserted that “he has 
standing to bring [these claims] as bailee of the property of Madoff 
Securities’ customers.”53 He also contended that the language and 
structure of SIPA gives him this power.54 Judge Rakoff was quick to 
poke holes in these arguments. First, he noted that Picard, as trustee, 
is standing in the shoes of the debtors (Madoff and BLMIS) to 
redistribute their assets, not in the shoes of Madoff’s creditors, and “it 
is settled law that the federal Bankruptcy Code (Title 11, United 
States Code) does not itself confer standing on a bankruptcy trustee 
to assert claims against third parties on behalf of the estate’s creditors 
themselves.”55 Second, SIPA says that the trustee is “vested with the 
same powers . . . as a trustee in a case under title 11,”56 and therefore 
it does not “implicitly afford the Trustee authority, beyond that 
 
48. HSBC I, 450 B.R. at 410. 
49. Id. at 410, 413. 
50. See Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC (HSBC II), 454 B.R. 25, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“[T]he Court rejects in its entirety the claim by the Trustee that 
he has standing to bring his common law claims as bailee of customer 
property.” (emphasis added)), opinion amended by Picard v. Merkin (In 
re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), No. 11 Civ. 763(JSR), 11 Civ. 
836(JSR), 2011 WL 3477177, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2011) (amended 
to include dismissal of the Trustee’s claims against UniCredit Bank 
Austria AG). Judge Rakoff plays a major role in many cases dealing 
with the Madoff liquidation. 
51. Id. at 29 (quoting Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 86 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
52. Id. at 28.  
53. Id. at 29.  
54. Id. at 30.  
55. Id. at 29 (citing Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 
U.S. 416, 434 (1972)).  
56. Id. at 30 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-1(a)). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Advocating for Asset Forfeiture in the Post-Madoff Era 
609 
afforded to a bankruptcy trustee.”57 Judge Rakoff even cited the 
common law doctrine of in pari delicto, which “precludes a wrongdoer 
like Madoff Securities from recovering from another wrongdoer.”58 
This means that the trustee, who is standing in the shoes of the 
wrongdoer, BLMIS, cannot recover from HSBC, the feeder fund from 
which Picard seeks billions, because they are both wrongdoers. 
To put it bluntly, Judge Rakoff “simply applied what he calls 
‘ordinary use of the English language’ to conclude that no reading of 
the relevant laws or cases grants Picard standing to sue the banks for 
unjust enrichment and aiding and abetting fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duty.”59 A few months later, Judge Rakoff’s colleague and 
neighbor in the Manhattan federal courthouse, Judge Colleen McMahon, 
bolstered Rakoff’s opinion in Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.60 Again, 
Picard was seeking damages under claims of “aiding and abetting fraud 
and breach of fiduciary duty, . . . unjust enrichment, [and] conversion,” 
among other claims.61 For the same reasons as Rakoff, Judge McMahon 
agreed that Picard lacked standing to bring these claims.62 
Creating even more doubt as to whether Picard will be able to 
recover the amounts he seeks from feeder funds are recent settlements 
such as the one between New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman and money manager J. Ezra Merkin.63 The Attorney 
General settled his compliant with Merkin, in which he accused the 
former hedge fund manager of “blindly [feeding] investors’ funds into 
a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Bernard L. Madoff . . . while claiming 
 
57. Id. at 30.  
58. Id. at 29.  
59. Alison Frankel, $90 Bln Answer: Rakoff Says Picard Has No Standing 
in Bank Suits, Thomson Reuters News & Insight: On The Case 
Blog (July 29, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2011/07/ 
29/90-bln-answer-rakoff-says-picard-has-no-standing-in-bank-suits/ (quoting 
HSBC II, 454 B.R. at 31). 
60. Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
61. Id. at 89. The full amended complaint asserted common law damages 
claims for “aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, 
‘fraud on the regulator,’ unjust enrichment, conversion, aiding and 
abetting conversion, knowing participation in a breach of trust, and 
contribution.” Id. 
62. Id. at 91 (“Three propositions, convincingly established in Judge 
Rakoff’s recent opinion and equally applicable here, demonstrate that 
the Trustee lacks standing to pursue his common law claims against 
Defendants.”). 
63. See Diana B. Henriques, Hedge Fund Manager Agrees to a Madoff 
Settlement, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2012, at B1 (stating that the deal was 
approved by a New York judge even though it would undoubtedly be 
challenged by Picard). 
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that [he] was actively managing those funds,” for $405 million.64 
Picard has sought an injunction related to the settlement, as he 
“seeks, among other things, the same funds fraudulently received by 
Merkin.”65 Picard believes that if the settlement is carried out, “little 
or nothing will be left for BLMIS customers,” and he has noted that 
New York should not be able to “give its citizens . . . a jump start 
over all the victims of this heinous fraud” by circumventing the 
SIPA.66 If the court denies the injunction, it will leave Picard with 
even fewer resources from which to repay the victims he represents. 
B. The Net Winner Cases 
The Bankruptcy Code authorizes Picard, as the SIPA trustee, to 
recoup funds that were the result of fraudulent transfers or preference 
actions in a process known in bankruptcy law as avoidance.67 
Preference actions occur when a bankrupt party transfers his or her 
assets to certain creditors in preference over other creditors.68 When 
these actions and other fraudulent transfers occur, the trustee has an 
opportunity to reach “both [the] payments of fictitious profits and 
withdrawals of principal” from the Ponzi scheme net winners.69 Once 
the funds have been recouped through avoidance procedures, the 
trustee may redistribute them to individuals who did not profit from 
the Ponzi scheme, the net losers. Picard is unlikely to recover anywhere 
near the amount he thought he would from the net winners though, 
and again Judge Rakoff is the person who has thwarted his plans. 
Picard is seeking a total of about $8 billion to be returned in his 
clawback claims against all net winners, but under Judge Rakoff’s 
recent rulings “about $5 billion of those clawbacks would be 
 
64. People ex rel. Cuomo v. Merkin, No. 450879/09, 2010 WL 936208, at *1 
(N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 8, 2010). 
65. Brief in Support of Trustee’s Application for Enforcement of Automatic 
Stay and Issuance of Preliminary Injunction at 2, Picard v. 
Schneiderman (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2012) (Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 
(BRL)). 
66. Id. at 2–3. 
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-1(a) (2006) (“A trustee shall be vested with the 
same powers and title with respect to the debtor and the property of the 
debtor, including the same rights to avoid preferences, as a trustee in a 
case under title 11.”); see also Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447, 450 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[P]rior payments made by the debtor can be, in 
effect, rescinded—or, in the language of bankruptcy law, ‘avoided’—and 
the money returned (‘clawed back’) to the bankrupt’s estate, from where 
it can be distributed among creditors in accordance with legal and 
equitable principles of bankruptcy law.”). 
68. Katz, 462 B.R. at 450. 
69. Tally M. Wiener, On the Clawbacks in the Madoff Liquidation 
Proceeding, 15 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 221, 222–23 (2009). 
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disallowed.”70 The reason is that Rakoff limited how far Picard could 
reach back to recover funds. In Picard v. Katz, Picard was seeking to 
recover fictitious profits and principal from as far back as six years 
before the fraud was discovered. But the opinion states that he only 
has the right to recover funds from “within two years of the filing of 
the bankruptcy period.”71 The result is that instead of possibly recover-
ing $1 billion from individuals such as the Mets’ owners, he has been 
limited to about $386 million. 
In addition to limiting clawbacks to two years, the Katz opinion 
also narrowed Picard’s ability to recover funds in another way. In 
lawsuits such as Katz, the trustee is attempting to recover funds from 
net winners using theories of “actual fraud, constructive fraud, 
preferential treatment, and the like,” but the court dismissed all of 
the claims except actual fraud.72 Under this type of claim, Picard 
must show an absence of good faith based on willful blindness or 
actual fraud by the net winners in order to recover their principal 
investment.73 As a result of this restrictive ruling, Picard and the 
Mets owners decided to settle for about $162 million, an amount 
described as a “major legal victory” for net winners.74 A number of 
legal experts believe that the settlement will “most likely embolden 
other defendants who are fighting accusations brought by the 
trustee,” because it is a “surrender [by him] on the explosive 
assertions that were central to the case.”75 
If Picard had not settled, and if he could not show actual fraud or 
willful blindness, his recovery efforts would have been restricted to 
only monies received by the defendants that they did not provide 
value for within the last two years.76 This means the recovery would 
only be for fictitious profits going back two years, and not for any of 
 
70. Alison Frankel, Mets Ruling Could Upend Madoff Bankruptcy, 
Thomson Reuters News & Insight: On the Case Blog (Sept. 28, 
2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2011/09/28/mets-ruling-
could-upend-madoff-bankruptcy. 
71. Katz, 462 B.R. at 453. 
72. Id. at 450. 
73. Id. at 455–56 (“In short, the Court concludes that, as to the claim of 
actual fraud (Count 1), the Trustee can recover defendants’ net profits 
over the two years prior to bankruptcy simply by showing that the 
defendants failed to provide value for those transfers, but the Trustee 
can recover the defendants’ return of principal during that same period 
only by showing an absence of good faith on defendants’ part based on 
their willful blindness.”). 
74. Richard Sandomir & Ken Belson, Mets’ Owners Agree to Deal in 
Madoff Suit, N.Y. Times, March 20, 2012, at A1. 
75. Id. 
76. Katz, 462 B.R. at 455–56. 
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the principal invested by the net winners. The net winners’ fictitious 
profits, not their original investments with BLMIS, are the only funds 
that they did not provide value for. This would have meant that 
recovery would have been reduced to a paltry $83 million, as 
compared to the $1 billion originally sought.77 High-profile outcomes 
such as this are having a serious effect on how much Picard can 
recover and redistribute in his “clawback” claims. The trustee’s 
inability to recover monies near what he is seeking in these lawsuits, 
as well as the duration of the seemingly endless litigation, suggest an 
alternative solution may be welcome. 
III. Asset Forfeiture: History, Purpose, and 
Objections to Its Use 
Either criminal or civil asset forfeiture would be more efficient 
and cost effective than the bankruptcy system currently in place for 
dealing with Ponzi schemes. This Note focuses mainly on why civil 
asset forfeiture is a better alternative for recovering money from 
feeder funds or net winners, but it is necessary to discuss how 
criminal forfeiture is being used as a tool against Ponzi schemes as 
well.78 First, this Part describes the history and purpose of asset 
forfeiture. Next, it discusses how asset forfeiture proceedings work, 
which unlawful activities allow the government to seize property, and 
how the government fairly redistributes that property. From there 
this Part discusses the advantages as well as criticisms of this 
approach as it relates to Ponzi schemes, and it addresses arguments 
that redistribution of property is best accomplished through 
bankruptcy proceedings involving a trustee. Finally, it dispels the 
criticisms that asset forfeiture is encroaching into the arena of 
bankruptcy and explains why asset forfeiture is a much quicker, 
cheaper, and all around more efficient means of accomplishing the end 
goal of all this litigation: quickly and fairly returning as much money 
as possible to the fraud victims. 
 
77. Picard’s actual fraud and willful blindness claims survived summary 
judgment in Judge Rakoff’s court, but that does not guarantee a win at 
trial. In fact, Judge Rakoff in his opinion even stated that although 
there was enough evidence to go to trial, he was “skeptical that the 
Trustee can ultimately rebut the defendants’ showing of good faith.” 
Picard v. Katz, No. 11 Civ. 3605(JSR), 2012 WL 691551, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2012). 
78. The government is able to bring both criminal and civil forfeiture 
proceedings against an individual or property simultaneously or in 
parallel, so deciding which is better is not necessary given the scope of 
this Note. 
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A. The History and Rationale of Civil Forfeiture 
Asset forfeiture has a long tradition in the United States dating 
back to English common law, but it truly rose to prominence in the 
1990s.79 The laws developed under an in rem theory in civil cases. In 
rem, translated as “against the thing,” permitted the government “to 
forfeit the property [of another] by filing a civil lawsuit against the 
property itself, rather than by filing an action—civil or criminal—
against the property owner.”80 This meant that “the [g]overnment 
could proceed against the property without having to wait until the 
owner was identified, apprehended and convicted.”81 Allowing the 
property itself to be treated as the offender in this way empowered 
courts to punish individuals who were, for one reason or another, 
“beyond the practical reach of the law and its processes.”82 In the 
1980s and 1990s, Congress expanded civil asset forfeiture authority to 
include proceeds of crime and property used to commit an offense. By 
doing this, Congress allowed law enforcement to use asset forfeiture in 
most federal crimes.83 
This expansion also gave more power to the legal fiction that is in 
rem forfeiture. Today, “proceedings in rem are simply structures that 
allow the Government to quiet title to criminally-tainted property in 
a single proceeding in which all interested persons are required to file 
claims contesting the forfeiture at one time.”84 Additionally, the 
proceedings in rem are still “independent of, and wholly unaffected by 
any criminal proceeding,”85 and “the role of the property owner in the 
commission of the offense is irrelevant.”86 The government’s ability to 
seize assets through civil proceedings has been limited in a few ways, 
specifically through the “innocent owner defense” enacted by Congress 
 
79. Stefan D. Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the United 
States § 2-1, at 28 (2007); see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 
446–47 (1996) (tracing asset forfeiture laws all the way back to 1827). 
80. Cassella, supra note 79, § 2-2, at 29. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 30 n.7 (quoting Bennis, 516 U.S. at 472 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting)). 
83. Id. § 2-4, at 33–34. 
84. Id.; see also United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 295–96 (1996) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that in rem civil forfeiture is not 
punishment for a criminal’s wrongdoing, and that Congress recognizes it 
on the theory that “in order to quiet title to forfeitable property in one 
proceeding, [it] has structured the forfeiture action as a proceeding 
against the property, not against a particular defendant”). 
85. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 295 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting The 
Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 15 (1827). 
86. Cassella, supra note 79, § 2-4, at 35. 
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following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bennis v. Michigan.87 In 
Bennis, the Court ruled that a vehicle used by a husband to engage 
in sexual acts with prostitutes could be forfeited even though the car 
belonged to his wife, who had no knowledge of the criminal activity.88 
The holding “did not sit well with Congress or the public,” and 
resulted in the innocent owner defense, which is discussed in greater 
detail later.89 For the most part, civil and criminal asset forfeiture is 
used by law enforcement as a form of punishment and deterrence 
against drug traffickers. But the government has recently started to 
extend its reach into other areas, including those historically 
dominated by bankruptcy courts and trustees. 
B. How Asset Forfeiture Works 
Unfortunately for advocates of asset forfeiture law and its many 
uses, the United States does not have a single, simple statute that 
says the government may seize any property used in or derived from a 
criminal act, unlike many foreign countries.90 The most comparable 
statute in the United States is 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which allows 
the United States to seize as part of civil forfeiture proceedings “[a]ny 
property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds 
traceable to a violation . . . of this title or any offense constituting 
‘specified unlawful activity.’”91 Specified unlawful activities include over 
250 state, federal, and foreign crimes, making this statute very similar 
to a catch-all or general forfeiture statute.92 The most important 
specified unlawful activities are mail and wire fraud, as they can be 
charged by the federal government in nearly any crime.93 
 
87. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2006) (“An innocent owner’s interest in property 
shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute. The claimant 
shall have the burden of proving that the claimant is an innocent owner 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
88. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443–46 (1996). 
89. Cassella, supra note 79, § 2-6, at 44; see infra Part IV.B. 
90. Cassella, supra note 79, § 25-3, at 742–43. Cassella laments the fact 
that no such statute exists, saying that it would “be simple to enact and 
would end a great deal of confusion in the practice of forfeiture law.” Id. 
at 743. 
91. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a)(1)(C) (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2006) 
(listing all violations of federal, state, and foreign law identified as 
“specified unlawful activity”). 
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7). 
93. Cassella, supra note 79, § 25-3, at 743; see also William M. Sloan, 
Mail and Wire Fraud, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 905, 905–06 (2011) (“The 
federal mail and wire fraud statutes are powerful tools . . . [that] have 
been used to prosecute a wide range of conduct.”). 
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On March 12, 2009, Bernie Madoff pled guilty to eleven counts of 
criminal activity, including mail and wire fraud, along with money 
laundering, theft, and embezzlement—multiple offenses that are 
specified unlawful activities under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).94 This 
means that any property related to those specified unlawful activities 
is “tainted,” and may be subject to civil forfeiture. “Tainted” funds 
are “proceeds or property . . . derived from, or used in, committing 
criminal activity supporting forfeiture.”95 The implication of this is 
that the assets of third parties can be subject to civil forfeiture even if 
the third party has not committed any crime, unlike in criminal 
forfeiture proceedings. For this reason, the money that the net winners 
and feeder funds received as part of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme may be 
considered criminal proceeds and therefore subject to forfeiture.96 
Currently, the government has not used forfeiture much as a tool 
against feeder funds and net winners. But it has recently begun to use 
criminal forfeiture to seize property from Ponzi scheme creators, and it 
seems that going after feeder funds and net winners is the next logical 
step, despite how much bankruptcy trustees may disagree. 
C. The Current Battle Between Asset Forfeiture  
and Bankruptcy Proceedings 
Perhaps no litigation proceeding better exemplifies the current 
struggle between bankruptcy trustees and the government than the 
lawsuits against Scott Rothstein. Rothstein owned a law firm in 
Florida that was in actuality a giant Ponzi scheme. He was the 
ultimate swindler, and described as “Bronx raised, Fort Lauderdale 
rich, and the politicians, charities and businesses that accepted his 
money rarely asked where it came from.”97 He owned, among other 
luxuries, a “white Lamborghini, 304 pieces of jewelry, [and] an 87-foot 
yacht.”98 Once the scheme was uncovered, unsurprisingly, a number of  
94. See Transcript of Plea Hearing at 3–4, 23, United States v. Madoff, No. 
09 CR 213 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) (noting that Madoff admitted 
to operating a Ponzi scheme and pled guilty to all eleven counts with 
which he was charged). Like Madoff, most individuals convicted of 
running Ponzi schemes are convicted of these same charges. 
95. Craig Gaumer, A Prosecutor’s Secret Weapon: Federal Civil Forfeiture 
Law, United States Attorneys’ Bulletin, Nov. 2007, at 66. 
96. See infra Part IV for a more detailed discussion of the possible 
limitations on the government’s seizing criminal proceeds currently in 
the hands of third parties. 
97. Damien Cave, Fraud Accusations Against Florida Lawyer Set Off a 
Race to Return His Donations, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2009, at A14. 
(“[H]e was known mainly for loud epithets, fast cars and big checks, 
written often.”). 
98. Jacqueline Palank, Prosecutors, Trustees Fight for Dominance in Ponzi 
Bankruptcies, Wall St. J. (Jan. 3, 2011, 1:01 PM), http://online. 
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704111504576059613947208394.html.  
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creditors and court-appointed trustees came out to stake a claim to 
all of the lavish items Rothstein had purchased, but they were too 
late. The assets were already in the hands of the federal government. 
Battles such as this between the government and bankruptcy 
trustees have become much more frequent in recent years. Some people 
disagree with the government stepping in and seizing assets after 
uncovering a Ponzi scheme, as these situations have historically been 
handled via bankruptcy laws.99 Yet that history has not stopped the 
government from “[i]ncreasingly . . . enter[ing] the formerly exclusive 
sphere of bankruptcy.”100 Because of the government’s aggressive surge 
into this area, the chances of prosecutors and bankruptcy practitioners 
colliding with each other in court have increased significantly.101  
As noted earlier, Picard is already colliding with New York 
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman over the proposed settlement 
with J. Ezra Merkin, a money manager who “collected hundreds of 
millions of dollars in management and incentive fees” from investors 
while he simply handed their money over to Madoff.102 Following the 
announcement of the $405 million settlement,103 Picard filed a motion 
for a preliminary injunction against allowing the settlement, stating 
that “New York should not be permitted to wreak havoc on [a] long 
standing federal mandate by using New York State law to give its 
citizens and perhaps others in a select group a jump start over all of 
the victims of this heinous fraud.”104 Although the Attorney General 
Schneiferman did not seek settlement with Merkin on asset forfeiture 
grounds, the “turf battle” between the New York attorney general’s 
office and Picard over who gets first crack at individuals such as 
 
99. John Pacenti, Prosecutors Fear Attorney Fees May Bleed Estate: Feds 
Want to Take Over Distributing Firm’s Assets, Daily Bus. Rev., July 
2, 2010, at A1. 
100. Jessica D. Gabel, Midnight in the Garden of Good Faith: Using 
Clawback Actions to Harvest the Equitable Roots of Bankrupt Ponzi 
Schemes, 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 19, 70 (2011). 
101. Myron M. Sheinfeld, Teresa L. Maines & Mark W. Wege, Civil 
Forfeiture and Bankruptcy: The Conflicting Interests of the Debtor, Its 
Creditors and the Government, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 87, 87 (1995). 
102. Reed Albergotti, A $410 Million ‘Turf Battle,’ Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 
2012, at C1.  
103. Henriques, supra note 63, at B1. 
104. Memorandum of Law in Support of Trustee’s Application for 
Enforcement of Automatic Stay and Issuance of Preliminary Injunction 
at 2, Picard v. Schneiderman (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2012) (Adv. Pro. 
No. 08-01789 (BRL)). 
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Merkin is a great example of bankruptcy trustees and the government 
hindering each other’s work.105  
Proponents of the status quo believe asset forfeiture is inap-
propriate for a number of reasons. They claim that (1) the purpose of 
asset forfeiture is to deal with crimes in which there are no clear 
victims; (2) “although returning criminal proceeds to victims is a key 
component of forfeiture, it isn’t obligatory;”106 (3) bankruptcy lawyers 
and courts, unlike the government, are experts in getting money back 
to victims; and (4) bankruptcy courts have traditionally been the tool 
used to redistribute victims’ assets when fraud is uncovered.107 
The government counters by saying that bankruptcy court “is not 
the ‘appropriate forum for marshaling and distributing assets to fraud 
victims.’”108 Federal prosecutors assert that they “can distribute assets 
faster and cheaper than bankruptcy trustees and attorneys,” and that 
“‘exorbitant’ fees and costs” charged by trustees “will have a 
significant impact on victim recoveries.”109 Additionally, assigning 
bankruptcy trustees such as Picard to the task of recovering victim 
funds is the functional equivalent of giving them and their firms 
“winning lottery tickets.”110 Trustees have no real clients to worry 
about upsetting and thus can collect enormous fees and prolong 
litigation for as long as they see fit. For these reasons, and because 
the concerns of bankruptcy advocates can easily be dealt with, the 
government should continue its surge into the Ponzi scheme 
bankruptcy sphere. 
In regard to the concern that asset forfeiture is intended to be 
used when crime victims are unknown, asset forfeiture may be used 
by the government to reallocate assets for known victims of fraud just 
as easily as unknown victims. The purpose of asset forfeiture goes 
 
105. See Albergotti, supra note 102, at C1 (discussing the lawsuit between 
the New York Attorney General and Picard regarding the order in 
which claims are paid to victims). 
106.  Palank, supra note 98. 
107. Sheinfeld et al., supra note 101, at 101–17; see also Palank, supra note 
98 (discussing the hostile battleground between bankruptcy trustees and 
U.S. prosecutors over which of them should have the right to seize and 
distribute the assets of fraud victims, particularly Ponzi scheme 
victims). 
108. Marcus & Greenberg, supra note 14, at 48 (quoting Letter from 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Barbara A. Ward and Sharon E. Frase to U.S. 
District Judge Louis L. Stanton, U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (April 8, 2009)). 
109. Id. Prosecutors point to the Rothstein case as a great example in which 
$2.5 million in fees had already been generated. That number is a 
fraction of the amount Picard and his team will earn working on the 
BLMIS liquidation.  
110. Id. 
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beyond simply punishing and deterring criminals. It is also “the most 
effective means of recovering property that may be used to 
compensate the victims” in cases involving property offenses and 
fraud.111 In fact, between 2007 and 2010 the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) returned over $1.1 billion of forfeited assets to victims.112 The 
reason for the government’s success when doing the heavy lifting in 
asset forfeiture cases is threefold. First, the government can “incur 
and defray many of the expenses associated with tracing and 
recovering assets at virtually no significant additional cost to the 
victim(s).”113 Second, the criminal and civil forfeiture tools available 
to the government are “very powerful” and effective at keeping 
criminals from dissipating assets before they are recovered.114 Last, the 
“DOJ’s ability to trace, freeze, seize and forfeit assets is truly global” 
and far reaching.115 This allows the DOJ to recover assets “based on 
long established mechanisms and clear treaty responsibilities,” which is 
important since “[c]riminals often put their ill-gotten gains in multiple 
jurisdictions.”116 Together, these abilities allow the government to 
retrieve more assets than their private sector counterparts such as 
bankruptcy trustees. Also, DOJ lawyers and the agencies they work with 
can do all of these things at a much cheaper price. The difference 
between what bankruptcy trustees receive in fees from the SIPC and 
what the government would receive could be allocated to victims instead, 
which results in a lot more money in victims’ pockets. 
Proponents of using bankruptcy procedures for the recovery of 
assets are correct that the government has complete discretion as to 
whether it returns forfeited property to victims. “[B]ut it is [the] 
DOJ’s policy to recognize claims of legitimate victims whenever it is 
practical and in the interests of justice to do so.”117 This DOJ policy 
is consistent with the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, which ensures that 
victims of crimes receive “full and timely restitution as provided in 
law.”118 As a result, when the government seizes fraud proceeds via  
111. Cassella, supra note 79, § 1-2, at 2. 
112. Jack de Kluiver, We Are with the Government and We Are 
Here to Help! 1 (2011). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1–2. 
115. Id. at 2. 
116. Id. at 3. 
117. Id. at 1; see also Letter from Assistant U.S. Attorneys Barbara A. Ward 
and Sharon E. Frase to U.S. District Judge Louis L. Stanton, U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, at 4 (Apr. 8, 
2009) (describing how the SEC plans to cooperate with the DOJ and 
SIPC and that all of the assets recovered from Madoff will be 
distributed properly to the victims and creditors). 
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (2006). 
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forfeiture, as it often does in response to Ponzi schemes, it takes the 
forfeited monies and, in proceedings administered by the Attorney 
General, distributes the funds to all victims on a pro-rata basis.119  
The government returns forfeited assets through two processes 
known as remission and restoration. The remission process begins 
with the government notifying all known victims of the crimes that 
led to the forfeiture.120 After receiving notice, the victims may file 
petitions to have the forfeited assets returned to them, so long as they 
meet certain eligibility requirements under the Code of Federal 
Regulations.121 The restoration process is similar to remission, but it is 
faster and does not require victims to file a petition.122 Because of 
this, restoration is “particularly beneficial in large multiple-victim 
cases.”123 These processes are inexpensive and effective tools that the 
government uses to redistribute assets to victims.124 Thus, bankruptcy 
proponents need not worry about whether the government is capable 
of recovering assets quickly and returning them where they belong. 
IV. Taking It a Step Further: Forfeiture of Feeder 
Fund and Net Winner Proceeds 
Not only is asset forfeiture the best way to handle recovery and 
redistribution of funds from the individuals responsible for creating 
the Ponzi scheme, but it is also the best and most efficient way to 
fairly retrieve and redistribute funds from third parties such as feeder 
funds and net winners. The reasons are essentially the same as those 
discussed earlier regarding the current battles between the govern-
ment and bankruptcy trustees.125 There are, however, some unique 
features about a SIPA trustee such as Picard that make asset forfeiture 
even more attractive. Those factors include an incredibly lucrative fee 
structure for the trustee and his colleagues, as well as an environment 
that lacks any sort of accountability. But before discussing the reasons 
 
119. Money Laundering Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Asset 
Forfeiture Policy Manual 108 (2008), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/2008policy-manual.pdf. 
120  Id. 
121. See 28 C.F.R. § 9.8 (2010). 
122. De Kluiver, supra note 112, at 7. 
123. Id. 
124. Jack de Kluiver, Acting Assistant Deputy Chief of the Asset Forfeiture 
and Money Laundering Section of the DOJ, puts the advantages of 
having the U.S. government help fraud victims nicely, stating that it 
“might not be practical or possible all the time, but it certainly can be 
cheaper, more effective, . . . and usually will give . . . client[s] a broader 
reach than . . . civil proceedings.” Id. at 8. 
125. See supra Part III.C. 
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why asset forfeiture is the best tool for recovering fees and fictitious 
profits from feeder funds and net winners, an important question 
must be answered: Is it even possible? 
A. Why Asset Forfeiture Can Be Used to Recover and Redistribute 
Money from Feeder Funds and Net Winners 
The first prerequisite for a forfeiture case to begin is probable 
cause. In an asset forfeiture situation the probable cause standard is 
the same as it would be for any other case.126 Using a totality of the 
circumstances approach, there must be “a ‘fair probability’ that the 
property was derived from, used to commit, or otherwise involved in 
the commission of an act giving rise to forfeiture under the applicable 
statute.”127 The applicable statutes that govern seizure of property for 
asset forfeiture in a case such as BLMIS’s Ponzi scheme are 18 U.S.C. 
§ 981(b) for civil forfeiture and 21 U.S.C. § 853 for criminal forfeiture. 
Of the two, 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) is more commonly used, as most 
forfeiture proceedings begin as civil forfeitures.128 
The government is able to seize the money involved in a Ponzi 
scheme like Madoff’s because that money was “involved in the 
commission of an act giving rise to forfeiture.”129 Those acts are the 
charges Madoff was convicted of, including mail fraud, wire fraud, 
theft, and embezzlement.130 These crimes are considered specified 
unlawful activities under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), and therefore 
commission of them makes all property involved subject to criminal or 
civil forfeiture.131 Together, the money laundering violation under 18 
U.S.C. § 1956 and the specified unlawful activities violations make all 
proceeds involved in Madoff’s Ponzi scheme subject to civil forfeiture.132 
 
126. Cassella, supra note 79, § 3-3, at 96; see United States v. Real 
Property 874 Gartel Drive, 79 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The 
standard of probable cause to support forfeiture is similar to that 
required to obtain a search warrant.”). 
127. Cassella, supra note 79, § 3-3 at 96 (quoting United States v. One 
1987 Mercedes Benz 300E, 820 F. Supp. 248, 251 (E.D. Va. 1993)) 
(other citations omitted). 
128. Id. § 3-2, at 94. 
129. Id. at 96. 
130. See supra Part III.B. 
131. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A)–982(a)(1) (2006) (stating that all 
property involved in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 is subject to 
forfeiture). Specified unlawful activities are defined as “any act or 
activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1),” which includes 
mail and wire fraud, embezzlement, and theft. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).  
132. A great example of how specified unlawful activity proceeds and 
property involved in money laundering are subject to forfeiture can be 
seen in United States v. Iacaboni, 363 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004). The 
defendant was convicted of conspiring to conduct a gambling operation, 
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Thus, as long as the government can trace the exact proceeds from 
Madoff directly to feeder fund and net winner accounts, they are 
forfeitable to the government. 
The idea of tracing proceeds is very important when seizing the 
assets of third parties such as these since “the Government has to 
show that the particular property—not some other property that 
happens to belong to the same person—was derived from, or used to 
commit or facilitate, the underlying offense.”133 This is unlike criminal 
forfeiture, in which the government can substitute untainted property 
of the defendant “for the directly forfeitable property.”134 This 
potential drawback has an advantage though, as it allows the govern-
ment to seize assets of third parties who were not in any way a part 
of a crime and return them to victims. Since only the property itself is 
named as the defendant, it is subject to forfeiture no matter who is in 
possession of it, so long as it can be traced back to a forfeitable crime and 
the owner does not have an affirmative defense as an “innocent 
owner.”135 
Unfortunately, this tracing requirement makes forfeiture against 
feeder funds and net winners in the current Madoff case nearly 
impossible. Since the fraud was uncovered in 2008, these entities have 
surely moved proceeds they received from the scheme to hundreds of 
different places. But as future Ponzi schemes are uncovered, tracing 
the proceeds should be much easier.136 As soon as the fraud is 
 
a specified unlawful activity, as well as money laundering in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). The defendant  
received hundreds of thousands of dollars in bets at his house, ran 
the gambling operation from there, and dispensed a portion of the 
proceeds to his employees. Some of the money he disbursed was 
for the employees’ salaries and expenses, and some was to pay off 
the winning bettors, but all of it was disbursed for the purpose of 
promoting the continuation of the gambling scheme. Thus, the 
payments constituted promotion money laundering, and the 
money involved in those payments . . . was ordered forfeited as 
property involved in the offense. 
 Cassella, supra note 79, § 27-8, at 808. 
133. Cassella, supra note 79, § 11-3(b), at 389. 
134. Id. § 19-4, at 575. For example, “[i]f a wrongdoer used a blue 1993 
Pontiac with a certain VIN number to commit [an] offense, the 
Government must name that car as the defendant in rem, and it must 
prove that that car is subject to forfeiture. It cannot bring the forfeiture 
action against a red Chevrolet of equal value that belongs to the same 
owner,” which it could do in a criminal forfeiture proceeding. Id. § 11-
3(b), at 389–90. 
135. Id. § 12-1, at 407. 
136. Ponzi schemes and other massive fraud crimes are likely to continue 
being discovered in large numbers as “[t]he drying up of money caused 
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uncovered, the government can freeze the assets of any investors 
involved in the scheme, trace the funds they withdrew from it, and 
then seize the funds as proceeds of crime to be redistributed to 
victims on a pro-rata basis. 
B. The Innocent Owner Defense 
Another hurdle the government must get over to seize the 
proceeds taken by feeder funds and net winners is the innocent owner 
defense. The defense was developed by Congress as a response to 
Supreme Court cases such as Bennis,137 in which the Court held that  
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment do not protect 
property owners from the forfeiture of their property, when the 
property was used to commit a criminal offense, even if the 
property owner had no knowledge of, and did not consent to, 
the illegal use of the property.138 
Since civil forfeiture is directed at the property itself, not the owner, 
“the role of the owner in the underlying offense was historically 
considered to be irrelevant.”139 The rationale behind such a decision 
was twofold. First, it was “in the public interest for the Government 
to remove the instruments [and proceeds] of crime from circulation,” 
and second, it “encourage[d] property owners to take greater care lest 
their property be used for an unlawful purpose.”140  
Despite the Court’s rulings, Congress and the DOJ still felt a 
change in the law was necessary. In 1996, the DOJ submitted a 
proposal to Congress that would establish “a uniform innocent owner 
defense that would apply to virtually all civil forfeiture actions 
undertaken under federal law.”141 The result was the Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA),142 which established affirma-
tive defenses for individuals with both preexisting and after-acquired 
property subject to forfeiture.143 
 
by the recent financial crisis has unearthed numerous Ponzi schemes 
nationwide.” Marcus & Greenberg, supra note 14, at 48. 
137. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996). 
138. Stefan D. Cassella, The Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Civil Asset 
Forfeiture, 89 Ky. L.J. 653, 654 (2001). 
139. Cassella, supra note 79, § 12-1, at 408. 
140. Id. § 2-6, at 39. 
141. Cassella, supra note 138, at 655. 
142. Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2006)). 
143. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)–(3). 
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For either situation, the innocent owner bears the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is in fact 
an innocent owner of the property in question.144 This means that 
once the government establishes the forfeitability of the property, it 
does not have to “put on any evidence negating the [innocent owner] 
defense during its case-in-chief.”145 If an individual chooses to produce 
evidence of preexisting innocent ownership, the elements he or she 
must prove are straightforward: ownership and innocence when the 
crime was committed.146 Although many of the individuals who invest 
in Ponzi schemes are innocent, they will most likely no longer be 
considered owners of their funds. Once an individual or entity turns 
funds over to a Ponzi scheme for investment, it loses its ownership 
rights in those funds because it no longer exercises “dominion or 
control over the property,” and may additionally be considered an 
unsecured creditor.147 If the funds are used to commit mail or wire 
fraud, for example, the government immediately gains a forfeiture 
interest in them as proceeds of crime, and that interest trumps any 
claim from the previous owners. This process is known as the relation-
back doctrine.148 However, the more relevant innocent owner defense 
in regard to seizing money from feeder funds and net winners is the 
one that deals with after-acquired property interests.149 
A provision of CAFRA deals with alleged property interests of 
claimants “acquired after the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture has 
taken place.”150 Section 983(d)(3) provides that individuals may have 
an affirmative defense as an “innocent owner” if at the time they 
acquired an interest in the property they “(i) [were] a bona fide 
purchaser or seller for value . . . and (ii) did not know and [were] 
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to 
 
144. See § 983(d)(1) (“The claimant shall have the burden of proving that 
the claimant is an innocent owner by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”). 
145. Cassella, supra note 79, § 12-3, at 410–11. 
146. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(A). 
147. See § 983(d)(6)(B) (stating that the term “owner” does not include “a 
person with only a general unsecured interest in, or claim against, the 
property or estate of another . . . [or] a nominee who exercises no 
dominion or control over the property”). 
148. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (setting forth the relation back doctrine, which 
states that the government’s interest in forfeitable property vests when 
the crime giving rise to forfeiture is committed, and therefore a third 
party can only prevail against that interest if he or she had an interest 
in the property before the offense or acquired it afterward as a bona fide 
purchaser for value). 
149. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3). 
150. Id.  
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forfeiture.”151 Courts have interpreted the bona fide purchaser 
provision as having come from commercial law.152 This means that “to 
be a ‘purchaser,’ the claimant must give something of value in 
exchange for the property interest.”153 Courts have not established 
exactly what makes a bona fide purchaser in civil proceedings, but 
generally they follow the bona fide purchaser provision in the criminal 
forfeiture statute,154 since it is nearly identical to the innocent owner 
defense in the civil forfeiture statute.155 In fact, the statutes are so 
similar that “case law interpreting one statute will apply to the other 
in most cases.”156 Generally, the case law holds that family members 
and donees cannot be bona fide purchasers.157 Some courts have also 
held that not only must value be given for the purchase but the value 
also must be equivalent.158 The feeder funds and net winners would 
 
151. Id.  
152. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 246 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(stating that the bona fide purchaser provision comes from “hornbook 
commercial law”). 
153. Cassella, supra note 79, § 12-6, at 433–34; see also United States v. 
One 1996 Vector M12, 442 F. Supp. 2d. 482, 486 (S.D. Ohio 2005) 
(stating that the term bona fide purchaser includes “all persons who 
give value . . . in an arms’-length transaction with the expectation that 
they would receive equivalent value in return” (alteration in original) 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B))). 
154. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (“[T]he petitioner is a bona fide purchaser 
for value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the 
time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property 
was subject to forfeiture under this section.”). 
155. Cassella, supra note 79, § 23-16, at 712. 
156. Id. 
157. See, e.g., United States v. McHan, 345 F.3d 262, 279 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(finding that a wife who obtained property from her husband in a non-
arm’s-length transaction was not a bona fide purchaser); United States 
v. McCorkle, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1321–22 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (holding 
that organization could not contest forfeiture of a car donated as a gift 
by the defendant); United States v. Brooks, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1041 
(D. Haw. 2000) (holding that a wife was not a bona fide purchaser of 
her husband’s forfeited assets simply because she contributed 
uncompensated services that increased the value of the marital estate). 
An arm’s-length transaction is defined as a “transaction between two 
unrelated and unaffiliated parties” or a “transaction between two 
parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as if the parties 
were strangers, so that no conflict of interest arises.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1635 (9th ed. 2009). 
158. See, e.g, Cassella, supra note 79, § 23-16(b), at 713 n.174 (“[A] third 
party, who obtains an interest in insolvent defendant’s property without 
giving something of equivalent value, is engaged in a fraudulent 
conveyance, and thus, cannot be a bona fide purchaser under state law.” 
(citing United States v. Frykholm, 362 F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 2004))); 
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have to claim they were bona fide purchasers under this after-acquired 
interest provision, as they obtained their interest in Madoff’s funds 
and fictitious profits after the fraud had begun. The feeder funds 
would likely argue they were bona fide purchasers since they provided 
BLMIS with the service of recruiting investors to the company in 
exchange for fees. Net winners would also claim that the fees they 
gave to BLMIS and the feeder funds to invest their money qualify 
them as bona fide purchasers with regard to the fictitious profits they 
received. Despite these arguments, the government may still claim the 
nominal fees paid by the net winners and services provided by the 
feeder funds are not of equivalent value to the forfeitable proceeds 
they received from the Ponzi scheme.159 The government may also 
argue that the fees paid by net winners in exchange for the investment 
of their money do not qualify them as bona fide purchasers of a service 
and entitle them to fictitious profits, since there was no actual investing 
being done. 
Even if the courts decide both the feeder funds and net winners are 
bona fide purchasers, the government may still seize their property if it 
can show they both were not “reasonably without cause to believe that 
the property was subject to forfeiture.”160 This additional requirement 
in the statute means that “[a] third party who acquires an interest in 
the forfeited property after the act giving rise to the forfeiture must 
show that he had no reason to know that the property was involved 
in a crime committed by another person.”161 Therefore, any third 
party who obtains property and has or should have reason to believe 
it was used to commit an offense cannot challenge the forfeiture.162 
Additionally, it does not matter how the third party became aware that 
the property was attached to a crime for which it could be subject to 
forfeiture, whether it be “first-hand knowledge, from reports in the 
media, or because the property was named in an indictment.”163 The 
 
see also United States v. 198 Training Field Rd., No. Civ.A. 02-11498-
GAO, 2004 WL 1305875, at *2 (D. Mass. June 14, 2004) (noting that a 
mother who received property from her son in exchange for $1 was not a 
bona fide purchaser). 
159. See United States v. One 1996 Vector M12, 442 F. Supp. 2d. 482, 487 
(S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that the claimant must show he gave 
something of equivalent value for the property subject to forfeiture). 
Any fees paid by the Mets’ owners to BLMIS were most likely not 
equivalent to the $1 billion sought by Picard, all of which may have 
been civilly forfeitable. See supra Part II.B. 
160. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2006). 
161. Cassella, supra note 79, § 12-6(b), at 437. 
162. Id. 
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key question is whether the information available to the third party 
would “put a reasonable person on notice that the property was 
subject to forfeiture.”164 
This provision is another way for the government to obtain the right 
to seize proceeds from feeder funds and net winners. The government can 
make a strong case that reasonable financially sophisticated entities such 
as the feeder fund investment banks should have been on notice that 
some sort of crime was being committed. Picard, in his complaints 
against these feeder funds, has in fact already done this.165 He argues that 
not only did the feeder funds fail to perform the proper due diligence 
required before recruiting people to invest with BLMIS but that they also 
were willfully blind to numerous red flags that were brought to their 
attention.166 For instance, in 2004 HSBC issued a due diligence report 
regarding Madoff’s track record, noting that it was “[t]oo good to be 
true.”167 Also, bankers at JPMorgan concluded that they had “only a 
faxed confirmation from Mr. Madoff that trades were occurring, but 
couldn’t verify it.”168 Although Picard’s claims against these feeder funds 
were dismissed for lack of standing,169 the government could use the same 
arguments to prove that the funds were on notice that the fees they were 
awarded from BLMIS were subject to forfeiture. Additionally, these same 
arguments can be made against wealthy, financially sophisticated net 
winners such as the Mets owners. Anyone else could still be subject to 
forfeiture if he or she pulled out their money as soon as they saw the 
“writing on the wall” about BLMIS’s inevitable collapse. These claims 
that the government would have to prove to seize the property of feeder 
funds and net winners are very similar to what Picard is trying to prove 
in his lawsuits as trustee anyway. 
Whether it is because they were not bona fide purchasers or 
because a reasonable person would have suspected BLMIS was 
committing a crime, the government should be able to recover funds 
subject to civil asset forfeiture from feeder funds and net winners. 
 
163. Id.; see also 198 Training Field Rd., 2004 WL 1305875, at *2 (holding 
that reading in a newspaper that drugs had been seized from the 
property gave a claimant knowledge that the property was subject to 
forfeiture). 
164. Cassella, supra note 79, § 12-6(b), at 438. 
165. See supra Part I.B.1 and note 30. 
166. See HSBC Bank Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 52 (“The red 
flags were shocking not only for what they demonstrated about Madoff’s 
investment strategy, but also for what they demonstrated about the 
depth of the Defendants’ awareness of the fraud.”). 
167. Id. at 108 (alteration in original). 
168. Michael Rothfeld, Trustee: J.P. Morgan Abetted Madoff, Wall St. J., 
Feb. 4, 2011, at A2. 
169. See supra Part II.A. 
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Proof of their ability to recover can already be seen in settlements 
reached between Picard, the federal government, and longtime Madoff 
investor Jeffrey Picower. The $7.2 billion settlement agreement with 
Picower’s estate provides that $5 billion will go to Picard while $2.2 
billion is claimed by the U.S. Attorney’s office under a civil forfeiture 
agreement.170 Lastly, even if the government is unable to recover all it 
seeks under asset forfeiture laws due to things like innocent owner 
claims, at least it will be at a much more reasonable cost than a SIPA 
trustee would charge. 
C. Asset Forfeiture: Cheaper, Faster and All-Around More Efficient 
The reason why the government should handle recovery and 
distribution of assets from feeder funds and net winners as opposed to 
trustees such as Picard can be summed up in one word: efficiency. By 
allowing the government to take charge of cleaning up messes such as 
the one left by Madoff, a resolution can be reached for a fraction of 
what it costs to employ Picard and his colleagues. Secondly, the 
government and the entire DOJ have much more of an incentive to 
end cases as quickly as possible and allow all the individuals and 
entities involved in these tragic circumstances to move on with their 
lives. The U.S. Attorneys have heavy case loads and lack any 
financial incentive to bring frivolous forfeiture claims or keep cases 
going longer than is necessary. Lastly, one must consider the power of 
the U.S. government and its incredible global reach to freeze and seize 
assets. For these reasons, asset forfeiture needs to be considered as an 
alternative to expensive bankruptcy proceedings following the discovery 
of Ponzi schemes. 
For his legal services, Irving Picard bills at a rate of $742.50 an 
hour.171 By the end of 2010 his firm, Baker & Hostetler, was paid 
almost $3.3 million for just his services, a figure that does not take 
into account fees paid to lawyers and consultants with whom he is 
working in order to litigate more than 1,000 lawsuits.172 In the four-
month period ending January 31, 2011, Picard and Baker & Hostetler 
 
170. Chad Bray, Challenge to Picower Pact Is Dismissed by Judge, Wall 
St. J., Mar. 27, 2012, at C2. 
171. Rothfeld, supra note 29, at B1. Some estimates put the amount even 
higher. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Madoff Case Is Paying Off for Trustee 
($850 an Hour), N.Y. Times DealBook (May 28, 2012, 9:42 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/madoff-case-is-paying-off-for-
trustee-850-an-hour (claiming Picard charges closer to $850 an hour for 
his services). 
172. Rothfeld, supra note 29, at B1. Rothfeld asserts that by 2014 Picard 
alone will have billed about $16 million in legal fees. But if you consider 
all those who are working with him on the lawsuits, the total cost 
approaches $1.4 billion by 2014. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Advocating for Asset Forfeiture in the Post-Madoff Era 
628 
requested that a judge approve a $43.7 million legal bill.173 And the 
fees do not show any signs of subsiding. From February 1, 2011 to 
May 31, 2011 Picard’s firm billed $44.7 million, with Picard personally 
claiming $600,000 in legal fees.174 And as of September 2012, the firm is 
seeking approval from the bankruptcy court for another $60 million.175 
Even Picard himself does not believe he and his firm will stop 
collecting fees any time soon, estimating that by 2014 they will reach 
$1 billion.176 Through October 31, 2011 the total cost of all Madoff 
liquidation expenses was $452 million.177 These extraordinary figures 
are the result of 285 lawyers working on the Madoff cases at an 
average rate of $437.89 per hour and 66 paralegals and staffers at a 
rate of $250 per hour, “as they scour[ ] the earth to recover money and 
assets stolen by Madoff.”178 Seeing these whopping figures makes it 
impossible not to wonder if these funds could be used in a more 
beneficial way. 
Before discussing a better use for the expected $1 billion in legal 
fees, it is important to identify where the funds come from, as they do 
not come out of the pool of money recovered by Picard. A trustee like 
Picard caught up in bankruptcy proceedings of this type is paid 
directly by the SIPC after he or she files an application for allowances 
and the court approves it, but there is no real oversight as to how 
 
173. See Aaron Smith, Madoff: The $43 Million Legal Bill, CNN Money 
(May 17, 2011, 4:54 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/13/news/ 
companies/madoff_trustee_cost/index.htm (discussing the scope and 
costs of the Madoff litigation). 
174. See Peter Lattman, Bill for Madoff Trustee Rises to $224 Million,  
N.Y. Times Dealbook (Sept. 22, 2011, 7:45 AM), http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/bill-for-madoff-trustee-rises-224-million 
(discussing the steady fees requested by Picard and approved by the 
bankruptcy judge in charge of the case). 
175. See Jacqueline Palank, Madoff Payout: $2.4 Billion, Wall St. J., Aug. 
23, 2012, at C3 (noting Picard’s latest request for additional fees at a 
discounted rate after receiving court approval to disperse $2.4 billion in 
recovered funds to Madoff’s investors). 
176. See Sorkin, supra note 171 (“And how much does Mr. Picard estimate 
the fee spigot will pour out by 2014? A mere $1 billion.”). 
177. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO 12-414, Interim 
Report on the Madoff Liquidation Proceeding 31 (2012) (“Through 
October 31, 2011, [Picard] reported spending of $451.8 million for 
liquidation activities. . . . [T]he two major components have been legal 
costs, chiefly for time spent by the Trustee and his counsel, and consultant 
costs, for work such as investigating fraudulent activities of the Madoff firm 
and analyzing customer accounts.”). The report estimates that total legal 
costs will exceed $1 billion. Id. 
178. Smith, supra note 173. 
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much the trustee may charge.179 The SIPC obtains funding by 
requiring all broker-dealers in the United States to register with the 
SIPC, and pay into its fund by means of an annual fee. The fee is 
determined after the SIPC consults with self-regulatory organizations 
and determines how much funding it will require to cover any 
necessary payments or loans.180 In 2009 the SIPC increased assess-
ments for membership, bringing current annual fee collections to 
between $400 and $450 million.181 Still, although it may be comforting 
to know trustees are being paid by the broker-dealers themselves 
rather than by victims whose assets are recovered, it does not change 
the fact that SIPC fees could go directly to victims if a tool such as 
asset forfeiture were used to recover and redistribute funds. 
Another concern about the large fees being charged by trustees 
and firms such as Picard and Baker & Hostetler involves the SIPC 
running out of money. Although the membership fees charged to the 
broker-dealers may seem like a lot, the current rate at which trustees 
are being paid is creating a growing fear in Congress that the SIPC 
may soon become insolvent.182 The fear is especially apparent in this 
current economic climate, with high-profile liquidations involving 
firms such as BLMIS and Lehman Brothers. Enormous bankruptcies 
such as these may cause the SIPC, an important investor protection 
organization, to go bankrupt due to excessive trustee fees. This made 
a number of lawmakers angry and worried about the SIPC’s oversight 
(or lack thereof) regarding these types of legal service payments. In a 
letter to the SEC, Congressmen Peter King and Gary Ackerman 
urged the commission to implement the Office of Inspector General’s 
 
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(5)(A)–(C) (2006) (“The court shall grant 
reasonable compensation for services rendered and reimbursement for 
proper costs and expenses incurred (hereinafter in this paragraph 
referred to as ‘allowances’) by a trustee, and by the attorney for such a 
trustee, in connection with a liquidation proceeding. . . . In any case in 
which such allowances are to be paid by SIPC without reasonable 
expectation of recoupment thereof as provided in this chapter and there 
is no difference between the amounts requested and the amounts 
recommended by SIPC, the court shall award the amounts 
recommended by SIPC.”). 
180. Id. at § 78ddd(c). 
181. See Dan Jamieson, Lawmakers Slam SIPC over Trustee Fees, 
Investment News (Apr. 12, 2011 4:37 PM), http://www. 
investmentnews.com/article/20110412/FREE/110419972 (“The SIPC 
fund now has $1.3 billion, even after paying $800 million to Madoff 
customers.”). 
182. See id. (stating that New York congressmen are worried about the lack 
of oversight concerning fees at the SIPC, and they believe that the 
trustee is driven by profit rather than a desire to help defrauded 
investors get their money back and that current law should be changed 
to allow courts to reject fee requests originally approved by the SIPC). 
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audit report concerning the oversight of SIPC activities.183 The audit 
and letter both voiced concerns over the “few, if any, limits on the 
fees that may be awarded” to independent court-appointed trustees 
such as Irving Picard.184 The inspector General’s report recommended 
that the SEC take action to fix a number of problems through 
additional oversight.185 Specifically, the report asked the commission 
to “negotiate with outside court-appointed trustees more vigorously to 
obtain a reduction in fees greater than 10 percent,” and deal with 
reports that Picard has “retained public relations advisors and other 
consultants whose role in aiding defrauded investors is questionable at 
best.”186 Lawmakers are predominantly worried that “the trustee may 
be driven by profit rather than the goal of ensuring that the 
defrauded investors are made whole.”187 
Congress is not the only group critical of the massive fees being 
racked up by Picard in this litigation. Many of the attorneys who 
represent the defendants in the clawback actions are upset as well. As 
stated by Helen Chaitman, an attorney with Becker & Poliakoff and 
representative of more than 800 former BLMIS customers, “Picard is 
going to wind up being richer than Madoff.”188 The real worry is not 
what Picard has received in compensation so far, but rather his fee 
potential. Many of these cases have continued and will continue to go 
on for many years. This leads to another major criticism of 
 
183. See Letter from Peter T. King & Gary L. Ackerman, U.S. Congressmen, 
N.Y., to Mary L. Schapiro et al., Chairman, SEC (Apr. 12, 2011), 
available at http://ackerman.house.gov/uploads/11.04.12SECletter.pdf. 
184. Id. (quoting Office of Inspector General, Report No. 495, 
SEC’s Oversight of the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation’s Activities vii (2011) [hereinafter Inspector 
General Report]). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. (quoting Inspector General Report, supra note 184, at 27). 
187. Jamieson, supra note 181. 
188. Wayne Coffey, Teri Thompson & Michael O’Keeffe, For Picard, 
Lawsuit Pays: Madoff Trustee Reaps Millions, New York Daily 
News, May 25, 2011, at 62; see also Objection to Sixth Application of 
Trustee and Baker & Hostetler LLP for Allowance of Interim 
Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses 
Incurred from October 1, 2010 through January 31, 2011, Securities 
Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard 
L. Madoff), 474 B.R. 76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 08-01789 (BRL)) 
(objecting to the large fees being paid out to Picard and claiming that 
he has violated federal law by, among other things, suing innocent 
investors, failing to report on BLMIS’s crimes, and reaching 
“sweetheart” deals with Madoff’s co-conspirators); Sorkin, supra note 
171 (“At $850 an hour, Mr. Picard and his law firm . . . are starting to 
look more like the princes of the Full Employment Act for Lawyers than 
storybook heroes.”). 
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bankruptcy trustees—lack of oversight and incentive to finish 
litigation quickly. Picard and other bankruptcy trustees are not 
accountable to a real client who may get tired of paying exorbitant 
fees.189 The only real oversight is a requirement that all fees be 
approved by the bankruptcy judge presiding over the cases, but 
judges tend to sign off on fee requests without much resistance.190 
These facts mean that, as Chaitman puts it, “[a]ssuming my 
information is correct . . . [Picard] certainly has an incentive to increase 
legal fees in the liquidation and to keep it going as long as possible.”191 
Without a real client to question charges, a trustee is also free to hire 
whomever he wants, including accountants and consultants, without 
any concern about repercussions. 
Although Picard may come off as a “bad guy” given the money he 
will take home at the end of all this litigation, in reality he is simply 
doing his job as the court-appointed trustee for this extremely 
complex and seemingly endless liquidation process. His duty is to 
“assemble the largest Customer Fund and General Estate possible” 
for victims, and he is doing that as well as anyone could have 
expected.192 As of September 2012 he has recovered $9.1 billion of the 
estimated $17.3 billion of principal stolen from investors in Madoff’s 
fraud, $2.4 billion of which was recently approved for distribution to 
victims.193 That $2.4 billion distribution was in addition to $330 
million already recovered and $800 million in advances from the SIPC 
for hardship cases.194 The remainder of the $9.1 billion recovered 
through settlements remains tied up in appeal processes and it is 
“unclear whether some of the settlements . . . will hold up,” although 
 
189. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 731 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that when a single person is given power, it is important 
that he or she be held accountable in some way so that “blame can be 
assigned to someone who can be punished”). If a SIPA trustee is not 
held accountable by anyone, what is to keep him from receiving his fees 
and in turn keeping litigation going as long as he can? 
190. See Lattman, supra note 174 (claiming that as of May 31, 2011, all of 
Picard’s fees had been approved by the judge overseeing the Madoff 
litigation without argument). 
191. Coffey et al., supra note 188, at 62. 
192. Picard, supra note 28. 
193. See Palank, supra note 175, at C3 (stating that Picard believes this 
latest distribution is a major milestone in the global hunt for stolen 
funds). 
194. See Linda Sandler, Madoff Costs Surpass Victim Payouts as Strategy 
Fails, Bloomberg (Apr. 30, 2012 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2012-04-30/madoff-costs-surpass-victim-pay-offs-as-strategy-
lies-in-ruins.html (noting setbacks in Madoff investors’ recovery while 
administrative costs continue to rise). 
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Picard is confident that the appeals will fail.195 Unfortunately, even if 
Picard receives permission to distribute the remaining $9.1 billion he 
has recovered, it is unlikely he will obtain the full $17.3 billion in 
principal, “let alone the $100 billion he originally sought” to recover 
when the liquidation process began.196 Even the SIPC does not believe 
he will recover all of the estimated principal, stating that “based on 
current Trustee assets, lawsuits filed, and the estimated possibilities 
for recoveries arising from [the] litigation, SIPC senior management 
does not now expect this level of recoveries to occur.”197 In light of 
this information, asset forfeiture becomes an intriguing alternative to 
the trustee process, as it would be less expensive, take less time, and 
obtain at least similar results. 
The government, unlike trustees such as Picard, has clients—
American taxpayers—to answer to. U.S. attorneys do not charge the 
enormous hourly fees that the trustee and his colleagues have 
collected, which means they have no incentive to extend litigation 
longer than is necessary. Finally, the government’s ability to freeze 
and seize assets is fast acting and global.198 As soon as a major Ponzi 
scheme or other fraud is uncovered, they can begin collecting assets 
for redistribution. In the end, the government’s ability to seize and 
redistribute monies from feeder funds and net winners quickly and 
efficiently makes asset forfeiture a much smarter option than 
bankruptcy proceedings following the discovery of a Ponzi scheme. 
Conclusion 
It would be naïve to think everyone will find either clawbacks by 
a trustee or forfeiture of assets by the government to be fair and 
equitable ways of dealing with situations such as these, but they truly 
are. This becomes apparent when they are looked at from the 
perspective of the Madoff investors as a whole. Though the net 
winners have a legitimate gripe about being forced to return funds 
many of them believed were rightfully theirs, they begin to look like 
“someone who upon discovering the money he has obtained ha[d] been 
stolen, refuses to return it to its rightful owner.”199 The lack of 
fairness in a situation like that is palpable, and “[e]ach time a court 
grants a winning investor the full extent of his winnings, every other 
 
195. Sorkin, supra note 171.  
196. Id. 
197. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 177, at 47. 
198. See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text. 
199. Gabel, supra note 100, at 76. Gabel goes on to say that “in that case, [a 
claim] that the unwitting thief felt so secure in his newfound wealth that 
it is wrong to take it from him, would fall on deaf ears in most courts.” 
Id. at 76–77.  
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investor is pushed further away from the full return of his or her 
principal.”200 There is no reason why people like Natalie Erger and her 
family should be left with nothing simply because they did not act 
quickly enough, or get lucky, like the net winners did. None of these 
investors will ever be made completely whole again. But the fairest 
way of dealing with circumstances such as these is to get each 
investor as much of their principal back as possible. In fact, courts 
have agreed with this interpretation, selecting the “Net Investment 
Method” as the preferred way of returning funds to investors rather 
than the “Last Statement Method.”201 The adoption of the Net 
Investment Method means a trustee like Picard can determine which 
investors may recover money lost in the Ponzi scheme by “subtracting 
the amount withdrawn from an investor’s account from the total 
placed with Madoff.”202 The court states that this method is far more 
equitable than the Last Statement Method, which would “have the 
absurd effect of treating fictitious and arbitrarily assigned paper 
profits as real.”203 Rulings such as this show that Picard’s actions are 
proper, but allowing the government to do it instead is a much more 
efficient alternative. Forfeiture of proceeds received by feeder funds 
and net winners accomplishes the same goal as that sought by the 
bankruptcy trustee, yet has the additional benefit of limiting costs, 
maximizing recovery, and quickening the process as a whole. The 
result would still be a largely upset or unsatisfied group of victims, 
but at least they would have most of their principal back and the 
ability to quickly forget their tragedies ever happened and move on 
with their lives. 
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